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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Overall Requirements for Propaganda Analysis

1. In response to your request this office has prepared the attached study of Soviet Bloc intelligence requirements. It would be highly useful to have thorough propaganda analysis on these subjects in support of national intelligence estimates. The list is, of course, illustrative rather than exhaustive and covers only the key areas of the Bloc. Moreover, it was prepared from the point of view of a consumer, and we recognize that some of the subjects might not, at least in their present form, be suitable for propaganda analysis. We are aware that it requires a trained propaganda analyst to ascertain which topics can be most fruitfully studied. Finally, we believe that propaganda analysis operations need not be limited to meeting such external requirements but should be a continuing element in the intelligence process, independently analyzing Bloc mass communications, and constantly providing to consumers like O/NE a self-initiated flow of analyses.

2. The wide use by the entire intelligence community of the existing FBID monitoring of Soviet propaganda is ample indication of the unquestioned value of this source in giving us insights into developments behind the Curtain. We believe, however, that the value of this great mass of descriptive raw material is greatly enhanced when analyzed by experts and put into more finished form. The propaganda analyses which have been done by OO/FBID's small analysis unit have been extremely useful in the preparation of NIE's. Cases in point are studies done for us on Albania, Yugoslavia, East Germany, etc. The very value of these studies convinces us that this source should be more fully tapped. In our opinion propaganda analysis can turn a Soviet weapon -- their propaganda -- into a potent intelligence tool, one all the the more urgently needed because the Soviet security system makes out intelligence data on this critical area so hard to come by and so sparse.

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3. In our list of requirements we have sought to provide FBID and FID with the guidance necessary to focus their attention on current and future problems of concern to the rest of the intelligence community. However, we believe that FBID should also be provided with the means to carry out retrospective studies designed to produce those necessary background generalizations on Soviet propaganda behavior which are essential to sound current analysis. For example, the implicit generalizations upon which are based the conclusions of such excellent studies as The Great Stalin Projects, and Nuclear Weapons in Soviet Propaganda should be susceptible of further testing and refinement. The absence of such studies is a major weakness which limits the ability of propaganda analysis to provide sharp and coherent interpretations. Therefore, we have included suggestions for such studies in our requirements in the hope that FBID will be able, either itself or through external research, to devote an increasing effort to building up this indispensable background material.

4. In presenting these requirements we are aware that many of them are already being partially met, insofar as resources permit, by FBID. We are also aware that every intelligence analyst on the Soviet Bloc (in O/NE, O/CI, OIR, G-2, etc.) is himself doing some degree of propaganda analysis as part of his daily work. We believe, however, that the RAND studies and others have demonstrated conclusively that the best propaganda analysis must be done by trained experts with a backlog of experience and with constant and ready access to all the background studies and raw materials. In our opinion this can be done effectively only by units such as OO/FBID and FID.

SHERMAN KENT
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National Estimates

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PROPOSED REQUIREMENTS FOR PROPAGANDA ANALYSISI. INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS ON SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Intelligence interest is focused upon the degree of control enjoyed by the ruling group and on the domestic policies pursued by them insofar as these policies have a bearing on Soviet capabilities or intentions. We believe light can be thrown upon these problems by answers to the following questions:

1. What evidence is there in current Soviet propaganda themes (e. g., the emphasis on consumer-goods production, the reliance on material self-interest as a stimulus for worker productivity, the avoidance of fear techniques) that a decision has been reached to relax the tension that marked the Stalinist period, to reduce the tempo of forced industrialization, and to return to the normalcy of a more conservative pace of economic activity?
2. What evidence is there that the regime has changed its traditional attitudes toward divorce, thrift, family pride, crime, etc.? What are the trends?
3. Is the new regime adopting a policy of reassurance toward the official and managerial class indicating an abandonment by it of the fear-inspiring personnel policy of Stalin and a decision to place its "wager on the sturdy and the strong"?
4. Does there appear to be an appreciable change in the amount and content of self-criticism indulged in by the elite journals under the new regime as compared with the old? Are the targets of self-criticism being restricted or expanded?
5. Stalin's past writings offer a glimpse of the movement of ideas going on in the Soviet ruling circles behind the facade of uniformity. What light can propaganda analysis throw upon the problem of elitist factionalism, the competition of "schools" of thought, and the relevance of this phenomenon to the formulation of policy? A careful study of theoretical writings in economic journals from the period of the Varga controversy to Stalin's article might provide an opening wedge into this problem.

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II. INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Intelligence interest is focused upon the extent to which any change has been or may be effected in Soviet foreign policy aims and foreign policy techniques by the Malenkov regime. From the point of view of immediate interest, indications of change with respect to current areas at issue, e. g., Germany, Austria, Korea, Indo-China, are desired. From the long-range point of view, indications of the abatement of aggressive intentions, of the extension of the time table of revolution, of a greater flexibility and adventurousness, etc., are equally desired.

1. Does there appear to be any willingness on the part of Kremlin leaders to accept a more precarious situation of control in Eastern Germany in exchange for a possible softening of Western solidarity?
2. Can any light be thrown on possible changes in policy since Stalin's time by a careful comparison of present and past policies in specific areas, e. g., Yugoslavia, Iran, Turkey? Will a collation with the events of the world political scene illuminate the extent to which any such changes reflect a new approach to politics, a new lightness of touch, or reflect merely an adaptation of old policies to changed conditions?
3. Is it possible to develop techniques of analysis to provide inferences regarding the respective roles played in the formulation of policy by such factors as: (a) historical or traditional Russian objectives; (b) the desire of leaders to conserve and consolidate their personal power positions; (c) ideological motives; (d) considerations of national security?
4. What light can propaganda analysis throw on the Soviet concept of "national security"? Do the Kremlin leaders conceive of it to consist primarily in the consolidation of their territorial and power base, or do they conceive of it in more relative terms as consisting in the manipulation of the balance of power and the undermining of the strength of the free world?
5. What is the Soviet estimate of US intentions? For example, does the Soviet leadership really attribute aggressive intentions to NATO, to the US base policy? If so, especially with respect to the latter, does the Soviet leadership believe the threat an imminent one?

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6. What is the Soviet attitude regarding the legitimate sphere of America's national interest?
7. What is the Soviet estimate of economic activity in the West, and what is the probable Soviet estimate of the effect of economic developments on Western capabilities and policies? Is there a difference in the treatment of this subject by mass media and elite communications?
8. Is there evidence that the new Soviet leadership believes that it can ultimately obtain all of its objectives by political warfare alone? For example, is it possible to infer from Soviet propaganda the conception which the Soviet leaders hold of non-Communist peoples' susceptibility to Communist propaganda, military pressure, conciliatory gestures, etc.? Are there any implications, with respect to this question, in the tailoring of propaganda to particular audiences?

III. INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS ON SOVIET BLOC RELATIONS

A. Europe

1. The character of the Satellite populations, their possession of independent standards of criticism, their memories of freedom, etc., present problems for the Satellite propagandist which are not present in the USSR itself. If, as a consequence, Satellite propaganda is more oriented toward combatting such incipient sources of discontent, an analysis of their output may provide valuable evidence on:
 - a. The state of popular morale. (For example, do reassurance themes regarding agricultural dislocation, living standards, etc., provide insights on this problem?)
 - b. The attitudes of the population and/or elites with respect to their relationship with Moscow. To what extent do the attitudes of the Satellite populations have to be taken into account by the local regimes in determining how far they can go in cutting them off from the outside world? Do these attitudes constitute a restraint in any way upon Soviet actions in the Satellites?

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- c. The extent to which Satellite populations identify themselves with a socialist community distinct from the West or the extent to which they continue to identify themselves with the greater European community. For example, what has been the reaction of the Satellite populations toward the West? To what extent do influential groups or segments of the populations attach importance to the espousal by the West of non-recognition of permanent Soviet control of the Satellites?
2. In what important respects does Soviet policy toward individual Satellite countries differ from Soviet policy toward the Satellites as a whole? For example, how do the Communists account for the continuation of personalized power in some Satellites, while others, e. g., Czechoslovakia and Hungary, have adopted the principle of collective leadership?
3. To what extent have developments during the past year (e. g., Berlin riots, new economic policies) affected: (a) Satellite morale and the reliability of Satellite armed forces; (b) Soviet views concerning the reliability of the Satellite populations and armed forces in the event of war?
4. Is there any evidence of tension or conflict within the Satellite Communist parties? Do deviationist or splinter elements exist within their ranks? If so, is there any evidence upon which to estimate their significance?
5. To what factors have the failures of production plans been attributed in the Satellites? Inferences may be possible, in this connection, with respect to popular attitudes or leader evaluation of popular attitudes.

B. Far East

1. Sino-Soviet Relations

- a. To what extent is China a model for "national liberation movements" in Asia? What are the Chinese assertions and the Soviet treatment thereof, and what is the treatment of this question by North Korea, DRV, and other Asian CP's?

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- b. What evidence is there regarding Mao Tse-Tung's doctrinal independence? In particular, what is the Soviet treatment thereof?
- c. What evidence can propaganda analysis provide on the problem of Sino-Soviet foreign policy coordination, and the degree of China's strategic initiative? For example, are there evidences of lack of coordination in propaganda treatment of policy moves, as, in the past, the invasion of Korea in June 1950 and the UN Menon Resolution episode, November - December 1952? Is there evidence bearing on whether either partner appeared, or appears, more anxious that the Korean war be closed out, or that a Korean political conference convene? What is the evidence bearing on whether China, in dominating Korean negotiations, is speaking primarily for itself or as a front man for the USSR?
- d. What light can propaganda analysis throw on the problem of Chinese sensitivity to Soviet primacy? What evidence is there of Chinese official or public chafing at Soviet assertions of primacy, or at Soviet influence in China? For example, what is the significance of apparent injured Chinese pride at UNC demand that the USSR be a party to a Korean political conference?
- e. What evidence is there on the question of primacy in Sino-Soviet-North Korean relations? (In particular, what is the evidence from Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean statements bearing on the question of which factor appears to carry the greater weight in dominating North Korean life: the physical presence of Chinese military and civilian personnel, or Soviet dominance of the NK Party and government?)
- f. What evidence can propaganda analysis provide on the question of Sino-Soviet economic relations? For example, what is the Chinese and Soviet treatment of the "socialist" character of China's economy; of the question of the degree to which China must lift itself by its own bootstraps; of Chinese dissatisfaction with the quantity or quality of Soviet economic aid and advice?

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- g. What evidence is there bearing on the question of Soviet or Chinese primacy in the direction of the Japanese Communist Party?

2. Internal Chinese Problems

- a. What are the shifts in domestic economic policy? How are they prepared? How are they explained? What inferences are possible?
- b. What light can propaganda analysis throw on intra-government and intra-party discipline and the significance of purges?
- c. What is the evidence of passive resistance, particularly on the part of students and the peasantry?

3. Viet Minh Problems

- a. What evidence is there of internal purges, and of the degree of prominence accorded Ho Chi-Minh?
- b. What is the evidence of DRV independence of strategic action, and of the degree of Chinese influence and direction in the DRV?

IV. INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS ON SOVIET MILITARY

- 1. Are there indications of change in strategic military planning? An examination of all media focused on the significance, with respect to war planning, of the recent shifts of the Soviet command may help to illuminate the tenor of present strategic thinking. Specifically, does it appear that the Soviet command emphasizes defense, retaliation, or aggression?
- 2. While our intelligence on Soviet troops stationed on the periphery of the Bloc is relatively good, we know very little about the effectiveness and morale of divisions in the interior. Will an analysis of propaganda directed to the troops in the interior, similar to the radio Volga analyses, throw light on this problem?

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3. What are Soviet attitudes toward the rearmament of Germany? We are not interested here in Soviet state policy, but in psychological attitudes. Does the historic dread of German military might still prevail, or has the experience of victory in World War II buoyed up Russian confidence to the extent of permitting them a freer and more adventurous policy in Europe? What inferences, bearing on this problem, are permissible from commentaries such as the 19 December 1953 talk by Frankenburg?
4. What is the effect of nuclear weapons upon Soviet military planning? What does Soviet propaganda output indicate with respect to the state of Soviet nuclear development (cf. the Nazi propaganda about secret weapons in World War II)? What does it indicate with respect to Soviet concern over nuclear warfare? What is the propaganda practice? What significance may we attach to changes in practice?
5. How does the USSR estimate the deterrent power of NATO? US ground forces in Europe? US air power?
6. Are there any new doctrinal comments upon the role of war as an instrument for the attainment of Communist objectives?
7. What is the Soviet estimate of the relative ability and resolution of the West and of the Bloc to wage a global war? To intervene in local wars? To endure a war of long duration? To undertake an atomic war?
8. To what extent does Soviet propaganda stress the need for civil defense training, etc.? What does this indicate with respect to Soviet concern over the imminence of war? Over the threat of US air attack?

V. INSTRUMENTAL STUDIES AND GENERALIZATION PRODUCING RESEARCH

We recognize that no one can predict ahead of time what generalizations about Soviet propaganda behavior are going to look like, and we are persuaded that only those who continually handle propaganda material are in a position to set useful problems for testing. The instrumental studies which we propose here therefore have in most cases been provided for us by the analysts of FBID or been approved by them as feasible projects for study.

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1. What is the pattern of the evolution of global propaganda campaigns?
2. What is Radio Moscow's audience? There is evidence that at various times it is talking to the masses, to the Western elite, to the bourgeoisie, to the left intelligentsia, to party workers, to party elite (at home and abroad).
3. What are the typical responses to major Western initiatives? (Note the similar patterns of response to Eisenhower in April, to Churchill in May, to Eisenhower in December.)
4. What importance should be attached to the identities of commentators? Who introduces the lines? Do some get special briefings, have special subjects, etc.?
5. What is the allocation of propaganda functions in the Bloc? What is the allocation of functions in comment on new developments? What are the differences, contradictions, anticipations?
6. What are the characteristic tactics in offsetting propaganda defeats, embarrassments (e.g., Soviet withdrawal from Iran, the Tito defection, the aggression against Czechoslovakia, the Greek guerrilla defeat, the Olympics fiasco, the Katyn Forest investigation, the Berlin airlift, election defeats, etc.). Various patterns may emerge which will gauge the Soviet estimate of the character and degree of defeat.
7. What are the typical propaganda techniques? When and why do they use silence, avoidance, counter-attack, and diversion?
8. To what extent does Soviet propaganda directly reflect the estimates of the elite rather than, or in addition to, his propaganda tactics? While of extreme difficulty, even partial answers to this question would have tremendous value. For example, the peace offensive following Stalin's death, the whole period from late December 1951 on with growing emphasis on disunity, the decline of aggression, the initiation of the East-West trade effort, and the German proposals in March might provide subjects for study bearing on this question.
9. What evidence regarding Sino-Soviet relations can be developed by a study of Moscow's Mandarin beam? For example, textual comparisons to identify and verify evasions, sensitivities, etc., may throw light on this problem.

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10. What generalizations can be developed regarding war time Soviet propaganda behavior? What are the characteristic patterns of response to stress, etc.?
11. What generalizations can be developed by a detailed historical study of the Nazi-Soviet Pact (where we have the highest capability in view of the German documents)? Comparison of overt propaganda with hidden policy shifts would probably provide specific keys and general insights on the connection and confluence of propaganda with political policy and estimates.
12. What generalizations can be developed by a systematic study of other first-hand insights into Soviet modes of operation, e. g., Yugoslav observations, Western contacts with Stalin, and others during the war, defector reports, etc.?
13. What generalizations can be developed by a retrospective study of all previous analyses for the purpose of extracting implicit and explicit generalizations for continuous testing?
14. What generalizations can be developed by a study of the relationship of elite to mass communications? The Soviet-Chinese treatment of Mao might provide a case study to illuminate this general problem area.